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Executive Summary
Contract farming is defined as an agreement, which 
may range from a simple verbal commitment to a 
written document, between a farmer and a firm, in 
which the farmer agrees to deliver fresh or partially 
processed products and the firm commits itself to 
purchasing the produce under certain agreed price 
and non-price conditions. Contract farming is 
usually considered a substitute for poorly func­
tioning or absent markets. The literature on con­
tract farming presents two opposite views of the 
potential of this alternative market institution as a 
bridge for trading between smallholders and agro­
processing firms. Some researchers argue that con­
tracts are an adequate mechanism for integrating 
smallholders into dynamic markets by overcoming 
the constraints of a failing market. Others warn 
about the downside of contracting.
We present the rationales for different types of 
contractual regimes between small-scale pepper 
producers and agroprocessing firms in the north­
ern region of Costa Rica under two market con­
figurations—namely, a competitive market and a 
local monopsony. Three types of contractual 
agreements [written contracts, verbal commitments, 
and no agreement] are found. The analysis is based 
on a survey of pepper producers using a semi- 
structured questionnaire to obtain data on produc­
tion systems and marketing arrangements.
Pepper is an attractive diversification activity for 
smallholders because it is a labor-intensive crop, 
does not require complex technologies or 
machinery, requires detailed attention and frequent 
disease control through the cropping cycle, and 
can reach high, fairly stable yields per hectare. A 
major drawback is the high entry cost during the 
start-up phase, stemming from the need for initial 
investments in crop establishment and the long 
maturation time before the first harvest. Contracts 
may help overcome these constraints and permit 
market entry at a reduced level of uncertainty.
A farmer's level and sources of income have a clear 
effect on his or her contract choice and bargaining 
power. Income diversification enables farmers to 
increase their asset specificity in pepper crops,1 even
1 Asset specificity means high specialization o f invest­
ments for a near-unique commercial purpose [Key and 
Runsten 1999; Hobbs 1996; Williamson 1991]. it has been
without the insurance provided by contracts. 
Therefore, pepper companies prefer to offer con­
tracts to less-endowed farmers who have some 
farming experience but limited income diversifica­
tion. These farmers are likely to engage in contract 
farming owing to their limited bargaining power. 
Even though the enterprise operating in the 
monopsonistic market also maintains high asset 
specificity, it is able to buy from some farmers 
without any prior agreement, since the latter pos­
sess limited bargaining options for valuing their 
asset-specific investments.
Farmers with contracts definitely invest more 
inputs and time in soil maintenance activities on 
their pepper plots. Resource-providing contracts in 
the competitive market have a stronger effect on 
farmers' investments than simple market specifica­
tion contracts in the monopsonistic market. This 
finding confirms the literature regarding the impor­
tance of resource-providing contracts and vertical 
integration for sustainable agricultural intensifica­
tion [Kuyvenhoven and Ruben 2002]. Budget- 
constrained farmers that intend to tailor their 
investment decisions in line with the designed tech­
nological package may substitute for the default 
level of fertilizer use with additional labor invest­
ments in soil maintenance activities.
Your assignment is to recommend a government 
policy to assure an acceptable level of competition 
and to facilitate increasing incomes and reduced 
risks for low-income pepper farmers in Costa Rica.
Background
Contract farming is frequently mentioned as a 
substitute for poorly functioning or absent 
markets. Contract farming is an agreement between 
a farm and a firm—either a simple verbal commit­
ment or one based on written documents— 
through which the farmer produces a fresh or 
partially processed product and the firm is com­
mitted to buying it under certain stipulated condi­
tions [Roy 1972; Glover and Kusterer 1990; Grosh
argued that a higher level o f asset specificity reduces the 
bargaining power o f one party with respect to another 
party [Kusterer 1982; Glover 1987; Key and Runsten 
1999],
1994], Contract farming serves as an economic 
institution operating between spot markets and 
vertical integration [Grosh 1994; Key and Runsten 
1999] and arises as a response to selective or simul­
taneous market failures for credit, insurance, 
information, factors of production, or commodities 
[Key and Runsten 1999], Contracts are one of the 
various ways of coordinating economic activities 
between a farmer and a processing firm, enforcing 
a certain type of supply chain management for a 
given commodity [Hobbs 1996],
The effectiveness of contract farming can be con­
sidered from the perspective of the farmer or the 
trading firm. Firms can use a variety of institutional 
arrangements to obtain raw products for 
processing or marketing, relying on different 
degrees of vertical coordination and related 
governance structures. One extreme is the spot 
market, where the transaction takes place among 
several actors and the price is set during the trans­
action. The firm does not participate at all in the 
production process, and all other aspects of the 
transaction [that is, quality, quantity, and timing] 
are nonnegotiable. In this situation there is no real 
supply chain management [Hobbs 1996], At the 
other extreme, with full vertical integration, there is 
a continuous flow of products and information 
during different stages of a supply chain and trans­
actions follow a corporate scheme rather a nego­
tiating-parties scheme. Here, the firm has complete 
control over production.
Contract farming takes an intermediate position, 
allowing the firm to participate and thus exert 
different levels of control over the production 
process without formally owning or operating the 
farms. It is mainly a way to distribute activities in 
the supply chain and the corresponding risk 
between the firm and farmers. The farmer bears 
most of the production risk, and the firm, most of 
the processing and marketing risk. The exact alloca­
tion of risk depends on the specifications of the 
contract. The firm chooses an optimum contract 
considering transaction costs and profit (Key and 
Runsten 1999), depending on the prevailing market 
uncertainty related to the transaction, the degree 
of asset specificity (including its bargaining posi­
tion), the frequency of the transactions (Hobbs 
1996), and the monitoring costs surrounding the 
production process (Singh 2002).
Contracts have the potential to provide mechan­
isms for incorporating small and low-income 
farmers into the market economy (Glover 1984; 
Key and Runsten 1999). Several authors argue, how­
ever, that contracts could also lead to market seg­
mentation and exclusion, thus generating more 
negative effects on farmers than positive ones 
[Glover and Kusterer 1990; Grosh 1994; Little and 
Watts 1994; Porter and Phillips-Howard 1995, 1997; 
Torres 1997; Siddiqui 1998).
In general, contracts can be classified into three 
categories that are not mutually exclusive: [1] mar­
ket specification contracts, (2) production manage­
ment contracts, and (3) resource-providing con­
tracts (Minot 1986; Williamson 1991; Hobbs 1996; 
Key and Runsten 1999; Singh 2002). Market speci­
fication or procurement contracts are simple pre 
harvest agreements in which the firm commits to 
providing a market outlet for the farmer (Hobbs 
1996). Such contracts usually stipulate conditions 
regarding price, quantity, quality, and timing (Singh 
2002). The farmer gets reduced market and price 
uncertainty as he or she transfers the produce to 
the firm without losing control of the production 
process (Hobbs 1996). Production management con­
tracts require the farmer to adopt specific growing 
practices, input regimes, and post harvest manage­
ment practices under the technical supervision of 
the firm. Resource-providing contracts require the 
firm not only to provide a market outlet for the 
farmer's production, but also to deliver specialized 
input packages and supervision to the production 
process. Hence, the firm obtains full control of the 
farm and the farmer almost becomes an employee. 
Resource-providing contracts are the closest situa­
tion to full vertical integration (Hobbs 1996; Key 
and Runsten 1999; Singh 2002). Beyond these three 
main categories of contract, many other forms are 
possible.
The selection of any of these contractual forms 
varies according to the type of commodity, the 
characteristics of the agents, and the market condi­
tions for a given period of time (Hill and Ingersent 
1982; Key and Runsten 1999). Although the firm 
decides on its organizational strategy, the farmers, 
in turn, can choose to engage in a contract or to 
sell the harvest on another market.
Delivery contracts between smallholders and 
agroindustrial processing firms are usually con­
sidered a device for reducing risk and a strategy
for guaranteeing continuous supply [Glover 1987; 
Grosh 1994], For the start-up of nontraditional 
agro-export production, contracts provide farmers 
with security and facilitate necessary investments. In 
practice, however, a wide variety of contractual 
agreements coexist, and local farmers may be able 
to negotiate different delivery conditions that serve 
their particular interest [Key and Runsten 1999], 
Contractual arrangements can differ in the condi­
tions of price and payment, the services provided, 
quality and production requirements, and input 
supply provisions [Grosh 1994], The aim of this 
case study is to illustrate that different contract 
forms may coexist. We present and analyze the 
contracts that pepper farmers engage in with 
pepper processors in Costa Rica.
Stakeholders
Pepper Production in Costa Rica
Pepper [ Piper nigrum  L.] production started in 
Costa Rica in the 1970s as an experimental crop for 
large plantations. The pioneer was the North 
American entrepreneur Charles Hunter, who 
started a plantation of about 15 hectares [ha] and a 
small processing facility in the northern region of 
Sarapiqui. The importance of pepper increased, and 
the crop expanded rapidly in the lowlands of Costa 
Rica and covered a maximum area of 500 ha in 
1990 [Rojas Zuniga 1994],
From the mid-1980s onward, small farmers from 
Sarapiqui also started to cultivate peppers. Laborers 
from the Hunter's pepper plantation took some 
seedlings home and started cultivating them in their 
own plots, selling the harvest to Hunter's enter­
prise, which had promised to buy it [Vega, personal 
communication]. In 1987 another North American 
entrepreneur, Walter Kinsing, started a new pro­
duction and processing company: Pimienta y 
Especias de Centro America S.A [PIMECA S.A.] 
and entered the market with his own 65-hectare 
plantation [Cubillo, personal communication]2. By 
1988 the Costa Rican land reform agency, the Insti­
tute for Agrarian Development [IDA], started a 
promotion campaign for pepper as a nontraditional 
crop for small and medium-scale producers [Rojas 
Zuniga 1989], This activity received strong support 
from the Coaiicion Costarricense de Iniciativas de
2 Ing. Abdenago Cubillo and Ing. Carlos Vega are local 
experts who were interviewed in 2000.
DesarroIIo [CINDE]—a nongovernmental organiza­
tion [NGO] funded by the U.S. Agency for Inter­
national Development [USAID]—in line with the 
export promotion activities within the framework 
of the structural adjustment program and trade 
reform policies.
The major share of Costa Rican pepper production 
is currently located in farmers' settlements in the 
Huetar Norte region. The current cultivated area is 
around 74 manzanas [52 hectares], the average plot 
is 1.22 mz, and production has increased to 2,458 
kilograms [kg] per year, most of which is processed 
and sold in the domestic market.
The marketing chain for pepper is relatively short 
and uniform. Farmers sell their harvest individually 
and directly to wholesaler-assemblers that process it 
to produce dried black or white pepper and take 
care of packing. Processors can sell on both the 
national and the international market. For the 
international market, pepper is packed in sealed 
bags of 50 kg and sold either to a broker or 
directly to a wholesaler. The broker sells pepper on 
the spice market, and wholesalers repack and distri­
bute the pepper to retailers. In the national market, 
pepper is sold directly to food industries that 
repack the pepper for retailers or use it as an input 
in processed food. A small fraction of the 
processed pepper is directly distributed to retailers 
or restaurants.
Methodology of Study
This study builds on data collected from 50 
producers [representing about 65 percent of all 
pepper producers]. Because a list of pepper 
producers was not available, farmers were found 
through snowball sampling. More information on 
the production zones was available through the 
IDA and the National Geographic Survey Institute. 
Three processing companies to whom the farmers 
supplied their pepper crop were identified.
The largest and most enterprise-oriented actor is 
Company A.3 This company has been active in the 
pepper market for 12 years and owns the largest 
processing plant with an advanced technology level. 
The company specializes in the production of white
3 The names of the companies have been left out in 
order to respect the anonymity of the companies that 
provided information for the case study.
pepper,4 and most of the production is sold to an 
international food processor based in San Jose, 
Costa Rica. Company A does not grow pepper 
itself but is exclusively a processing company that 
obtains the raw produce from smallholders. Its rela­
tionship with the farmers was initially based on 
verbal agreements, but since 1998 the company has 
also offered written contracts.
The other agroprocessor, Company B, operates a 
smaller plant with simple technology and is pre­
dominantly a producer-processor; it owns a large 
plantation of about 110 ha of pepper at different 
stages of growth. In the year 2000, Company B 
started to buy pepper from small producers to 
smooth its supply and keep the plant running at 
maximum capacity. Plant diseases have forced the 
company to renovate most of its own plantation. 
Company B processes black pepper and prefers to 
sell in the international market, but currently the 
processed pepper is sold domestically because the 
company claims that with its current low output, 
transportation costs are too high to allow for 
profitable sales abroad.
Company C is a small private producer/processor 
in the northern zone, owned by a former small 
pepper producer, that used to sell the harvest to 
Company A. Company C decided to start doing its 
own processing, however, when Company A 
refused its harvest several times owing to quality 
considerations. It is a very simple, small-scale plant 
and produces only whole-grain black pepper for 
the domestic market. By the year 2000, Company 
C started buying regularly from other farmers. 
Although this firm claims to work without any 
type of agreement, some farmers stated that they 
do have an informal agreement, in which the 
processor promises to buy their harvest on a fixed 
day and the payment is made in cash at the 
moment of the transaction.
Table I summarizes the characteristics of the three 
companies. Part of the pepper sales take place with­
out any prior arrangement, especially when 
processing firms face limited supply. The contrac­
tual arrangements include various obligations for 
the farmer regarding the use of specified seedlings, 
input applications, and frequency and place of
4 The company can also produce small amounts of black 
pepper at the request of its main customers.
delivery. Obligations for the buyer refer to the 
price paid for pepper, the payment system and the 
provision of technical assistance.
Most important differences between the three 
buyers are related to the types of guarantees used 
for enforcing delivery, the procedures for price 
determination, and whether instantaneous or 
delayed payments are preferred.
In addition to these three processors, there are also 
an unidentified number of other intermediaries that 
buy directly from the farmers, but only sporadi­
cally (for instance, once or twice a year]. They act 
mainly as middlemen between farmers and food­
processing companies making emergency purchases 
when facing problems with their regular supplies of 
pepper.
Contract Types According to Region
In terms of the farmers selling pepper, we dis­
tinguish a region where only Company A is active 
[where Company A has a monopsonic market] and 
a region where all three companies procure pepper 
from farmers. Table 2 gives an overview of the dis­
tribution of farmers over contracting arrangements. 
Five contractual conditions are identified, namely: 
[1] farmers with written contracts in a monopsony 
market; [2] farmers with verbal contracts in a 
monopsony market; [3] farmers delivering without 
any contract in a monopsony market; [4] farmers 
with verbal contracts in the competitive market; 
and [5] farmers delivering without any agreement in 
the competitive market.
The essential difference between the contracts pro­
vided by the companies refers to product and 
process specifications. Written and verbal contracts 
by Companies A and B are defined as resource­
providing arrangements that include input delivery 
and technical assistance. These contracts closely 
resemble quasi-vertical integration based on long­
term co-investment activities (Hobbs 1996], For 
Company B, resource provision is part of a strategy 
of backward integration aimed at supplementing 
raw material delivery to the processing plant. On 
the other hand, verbal agreements provided by 
Company C are strictly market-specification con­
tracts that are limited to provisions regarding price, 
delivery time and quantity. The latter types of 
arrangements refrain from any involvement in the 
production process and are limited to simple 
product delivery specifications.
Table 1: M ain Characteristics o f Processing Companies in  the Study
B uyer/
Characteristics Scale
Reg ion  o f  
in fluence
T e c h n o lo g y
level
Years o f  
experience
Years o f  
relations with 
small farm ers
T arget
m arket
T yp e s  o f  agreem ents with 
farm ers
C O M P A N Y  A
• Agroprocessor
• Preferred supplier 
arrangements
Large San Carlos, 
San Ramon, 
Sarapiqui
High 10 10 National 
and inter­
national
Written contracts, 
verbal agreements
C O M P A N Y  B
• Agro-processor- 
producer
• Vertical integration
Medium Grecia Middle 12 Buyer: 9
Agreements 
: 5
National 
and inter­
national
Verbal agreements
C O M P A N Y  C
• Producer-small 
processor
Small Sarapiqui,
Grecia
Low Processor:
5
Producer:
2 National informal and verbal 
agreements
• Delivery dates 10
Intermediaries
• Buying for Costa 
Rican or Nicaraguan 
processors
Very
small
Guatuso,
Chachagua
Low 1-2 1-2 National 
and inter­
national
None, buy only 
sporadically
Table 2 : Sample Size fo r Each C ontractual C ondition_____________________________________
Contracting arrangement 
Written Verbal
Type of market/main buyer_______________ contract______agreement No agreement_______ Total
Monopsony market
Company A 9 11 3 23
Competitive market
Company A 7 3 10
Company B 9 1 10
Company C 4 3 7
Total 9 31 10 50
It is hardly possible to establish a preference 
ranking between agreements on the basis of the 
differences described. Selection of specific agree­
ments mainly depends on the needs and pref­
erences of particular farmers. Poorer and less- 
endowed farmers may prefer a written contract to 
a verbal commitment or no commitment at all. In 
terms of input and service provision, farmers will 
generally be better off with an agreement from 
Company B. On the other hand, when farmers 
prefer flexibility, rapid payments, and few restric­
tions, they will probably choose Company C.
To identify what types of farmers typically engage 
in contractual delivery of pepper to local buyers, 
we compare the farm-household and production 
characteristics in each market segment in Table 3. 
Farmers with an agreement operating in the com­
petitive market generally own smaller, less fertile 
farms on flatter land. More experienced and less 
educated farmers in this market segment prefer 
verbal agreements over no agreement. In addition, 
land is more intensively used, although their pepper 
production is lower than that of farmers with no 
agreements. Producers operating in the competitive 
market with verbal commitments own older pepper 
plantations but obtain a lower procurement price. 
Finally, these producers use more technical assis­
tance than farmers with no agreements.
On the other hand, the monopsony market 
segment contains mostly younger farmers with 
smaller farms and more specialized farming systems. 
They operate more recently established plantations 
that are larger in size but have considerably lower 
productivity. Most farmers are affiliated with 
farmers' organizations in order to reinforce their 
bargaining position. Further analysis shows that 
farmers contracting with Company B depend the 
least on pepper production but achieve better 
yields, whereas farmers delivering to Company A 
are usually poorer and more engaged in off-farm 
activities, thus requiring additional technical 
assistance.
Comparing farm-household characteristics with 
different types of contracts reveals written con­
tracts only among farmers in the monopsony 
region. Such contracts offer a guaranteed minimum 
price and assure a purchase commitment by the 
firm for a period of 15 years, which reduces the 
farmer's price and market risk. Young, better- 
educated producers who own small farms, have less 
farming experience, and have limited land endow­
ment and investments in pepper usually prefer 
formal or written contracts. Moreover, farmers 
with contracts have lower incomes and rely more 
on other nonagricuitural sources of income. There­
fore, farmers relying on formal contracts are likely 
to have reduced risks during the initial establish­
ment phase [two years without harvest]. Producers 
engaged in pepper production under verbal agree­
ments, on the other hand, are generally older, have 
less formal education, and have been farming for a 
considerably longer period of time. They operate 
more mature plantations and seek guaranteed 
market outlets. Finally, farmers without any 
contractual arrangement own the largest farms and 
the largest investment in new pepper plots. They 
achieve the highest pepper yields but prefer to 
remain independent in their marketing operations. 
Besides, they have a higher share of their income 
from other commercial crops and rely less on 
income from nonagricuitural activities.
The comparison of market segments and contrac­
tual arrangements shows that especially less edu­
cated, poorer farmers with limited farming 
experience prefer a verbal contract. Since they own 
older plantations and are strongly dependent on 
pepper revenues, they have to rely on risk­
minimizing marketing strategies (Magnusson and 
Ottoson 1996). On the other hand, larger farmers 
that maintain younger, high-yielding pepper planta­
tions are more likely to rely on spot market 
exchange as part of their risk diversification strat­
egy. Pepper prices are slightly higher in the com­
petitive market, and farmers without a contract 
were even able to negotiate a more attractive price.
Table 3 : Farm -Household Characteristics A ccord ing  to  Type o f Agreem ent___________________
________Monopsony market___________ Competitive market
Formal Verbal No Verbal No
Variable contract agreement agreement agreement agreement
Number of cases (N) 9 II 3 20 7
Farm characteristics
Farm area ( manzansr, 1 mz = 0.7 ha] 12.30* 15.00 34.6* 27.2 73.10
Soil fertility [3 = high] 2.67 2.36 2.00 1.90* 2.14*
Drainage [1 = good] .45 .36 .67 .25 .14
Soil erosion [1 = yes] .56 .18 .33 .25 .29
Mountainous land [1 = yes] .78* .36* .67 .70** 1.00**
Household characteristics
Household size [number of persons] 4.70 4.50 5.00 4.50 3.40
Age of head of household [years] 39.70** 48.00** 37.00 50.60 47.90
Education level [secondary = 1] _7Q * * * .18*** .67 .45* .57*
Farming experience [years] 17.20*** 33.50*** 20.30 32.90* 21.00*
Off-farm employment (1 = yes] .67 .36 .33 .60 .43
Gross household income [US$/year] 4,231* 5,205 16,054* 6,752 4,344
Income from other nonagricultural 39.02** 32.50** 3.02** 24.02 41.52
activities (share of gross household 
income]
Production system characteristics
Share of arable farm land (%] 52.9 45.80 84.40 40.90*** 9.40***
Experience in pepper production [years] 5.60 7.00 9.30 6.80 8.60
Area of pepper in production [mz] .91 .79 .83 .64 .52
Area of pepper not in production [mz] .27*** .67 1.87*** .47 .63
Age of plantation [years] 3.80 6.30* 3.0* 6.5* 4.6*
Degree of specialization (share of arable 29.20 36.00 25.40 31.00 24.10
land under pepper]
Pepper yield (kg/ mz per year] 3.64 3.22 3.65 7.25 8.43
Output index3 .80 .61** 1.44** 1.07* 1.42*
Mean price of pepper sold [US$] .90 .90 .90 92 *** ,94 ***
% of income from commercial crops 21.00 17.50* 25.76* 13.50 8.04
(share of gross household income] 
% of income from cattle production 3.00 11.05 5.82 20.66 17.28
(share of gross household income]
% of income from pepper (share of gross 30.20 31.50 22.30 34.76 33.12
household income]
Institutional characteristics
Use of technical assistance (1 =  yes] 1.00 .91 1.00 .80** .57**
Use of credit (1 =  yes] .56 .55 .67 .35 .14
Member of farmers' organization (1 = .67 .55 1.00 .30 .43
yes]__________________________________________________________________ _______________________
Note: T-test and A N O V A  test of significant differences of means: * * *  significant at 1% level; * *  significant at 5 %  level; * 
significant at 10%  level.
a The output index is calculated by considering the yield reached by the farmers compared with the attainable yield for the 
corresponding age of the plantation, as published in technical manuals for pepper production. An index of less than 1 
indicates that yield is below the prescribed value.
Policy Issues
Contracts as Insurance Devices
This analysis has revealed that younger and better- 
educated farmers with limited land endowments and 
investments in pepper prefer written contracts 
rather than verbal agreements. Farm households 
with nearly 40  percent of their income derived 
from nonagricultural activities follow a risk- 
management strategy to cope with liquidity con­
straints. Although this strategy might have negative 
effects on production efficiency, for low-income 
farmers it tends to be the preferred option for 
smoothing consumption [Key and Runsten 1999). 
Therefore, these households opt for the insurance 
provided by a written contract before engaging in 
the production of specialized nontraditional crops. 
Contracts offer insurance against price fluctuations 
and the uncertainties related to finding appropriate 
market outlets. Income-constrained farmers are 
willing to accept the conditions imposed by a 
written contract simply because they do not have 
enough sources of income to cope with market and 
price uncertainty, even when the price conditions 
stated in the contract are less favorable than those 
offered in the spot markets.
On the other hand, farmers without agreements 
are far less dependent on single agricultural activi­
ties. They derive income from other commercial 
crops that enable them to cope with uncertainties 
related to the pepper market. In summary, the 
more farmers rely on pepper production for their 
income generation, the more they need a stable 
contractual arrangement with a buyer.
Another interesting result of the analysis is that 
income diversification has a direct effect on con­
tract choice. Income from other commercial crops 
provides farmers with bargaining power that 
enables them to refrain from contractual ties, 
whereas income derived from nonagricultural activi­
ties seemingly does not generate the same effect. A  
possible explanation is that the latter income is 
composed of several sources, ranging from non­
agricultural wage labor to remittances from rela­
tives outside the household. This income composi­
tion may restrict its use for production purposes. 
Conversely, income from other commercial crops 
is entirely under the farmer's control and can be 
applied according to his or her own criteria. In 
addition, off-farm activities restrict farmers' labor
availability in critical periods and could thus reduce 
the labor intensity required for critical crop 
management practices in pepper production.
Contracts as Incentives
This analysis has shown that contracts provide an 
important incentive for more intensive input use, 
but also tend to induce a shift toward hiring wage 
labor to replace family labor (see Saenz-Segura 
2006, 50, for details on the impact of contracts on 
pepper production systems). This finding only 
partly confirms the hypothesis that contracts 
improve certainty for small-scale producers and 
hence increase their willingness to invest. The fact 
that mainly less-endowed farmers choose contracts 
points in the same direction. Contracts clearly 
improve access to inputs and information, thus 
reducing existing market failures. Consequently, 
contracts could complement policies aiming at 
more efficient land use systems. Even when farmers 
are equally informed about suitable land manage­
ment technologies, those with contracts are likely 
to implement more soil conservation practices.
It has been argued that different types of contracts 
may have adverse effects on the adoption of soil 
conservation measures (Rickson and Burch 1996). 
Short-term production goals imposed by the 
processing firms may restrain farmers from adopt­
ing soil conservation practices, which usually 
demand large amounts of labor time. Moreover, 
markets for specialized inputs and services are 
usually inaccessible to low-income farmers [Key and 
Runsten 1999). In the pepper case, products such as 
organic fertilizers and calcium not only contribute 
to maintaining good soil conditions, but also help 
prevent fungi attacks. Farmers facing budget con­
straints often cannot maintain the whole technical 
package (that is, fertilizing regimes] designed for 
export crops and rely more on the exploitation of 
their soil nutrient stocks.
In the monopsonistic market segment, the buyer 
offers resource-providing contracts, which mostly 
focus on seedling provision and technical assistance. 
Therefore, resource-constrained farmers would 
look for the insurance of contracts before investing 
in disease prevention and soil maintenance practices 
that increase their asset specificity. Actually, the 
contract functions as a catalytic vehicle to entice
these farmers toward risk-taking behavior. In the 
competitive market segment, one of the buyers 
offers a resource-providing contract that includes 
fertilizer and pesticide supply, resulting in higher 
use of biocides and soil maintenance inputs by con­
tracting farmers. On the other hand, farmers with 
no agreement pay little or no attention to these 
practices. A possible explanation is that this cate­
gory of farmers is younger, has less farming 
experience, and has more land availability. Even 
though they achieve higher yields in pepper 
production, they consider the crop a second-best 
option from which they derive some additional 
income while spending little time and limited 
investments on crop maintenance and soil conser­
vation activities. Farmers without contracts thus 
sidestep the early nonproductive phases of pepper 
production and use idle land with good soil 
nutrient stocks rather than investing in soil main­
tenance activities.
Contracts for Market Information
The effects of contracts under different market 
situations show that local monopsonies might gen­
erate rather perverse incentives for making fixed 
investments in pepper plantations compared with 
situations where competition between buyers exists. 
Recorded per hectare yields in the monopsony 
region are substantially lower than in the competi­
tive market region, even when farmers use more 
inputs. Local monopsonies could favor a transition 
toward more capital-intensive production systems, 
especially when relying on resource-providing con­
tractual regimes that temporarily reduce input 
costs. This situation points to close complemen­
tarities between decisions about technology choice 
and the type of market organization.
Farmers with no contractual arrangements have less 
access to market information, use less credit, and 
are more willing to deviate from a potential agree­
ment with the buyer. Providing accurate informa­
tion about the required amounts and desired 
quality characteristics is crucial for efficient 
product coordination between farmers and buyers 
[Key and Runsten 1999], Information about the 
structure of the market is also important to 
prevent false expectations and adverse selection 
problems. This need is especially relevant for less- 
experienced farmers operating in the rather closed 
and specialized pepper market. Farmers who 
produce pepper only as a diversification crop can
accept the risks associated with missing market 
information. Hence, they will not allocate many 
resources to obtaining this information on their 
own. On the other hand, farmers with contracts 
are usually better informed and more committed to 
the agreement with the buyer. Resource-providing 
contracts are likely to encourage input intensifica­
tion, particularly in the competitive market 
segment. Similarly, contracting farmers are less 
likely to deviate from delivery arrangements, mainly 
because they are aware of their limited bargaining 
power in relation to the buyer.
Although asymmetric information is always present 
between buyers and sellers in developing countries, 
contracts can provide an appropriate mechanism to 
cope with market information problems. The 
loyalty of farmers is likely to be more related to 
their lack of bargaining power, however, than to 
the availability of market information. The fixed 
cost of obtaining accurate market information may 
be prohibitive for income-constrained farmers, and 
they are therefore fully dependent on the informa­
tion provided by the processing firms.
Policy Options
Public and Private Roles for Contract 
Development
Although contracts are essentially private, there is 
still an important place for public action to safe­
guard the efficiency, equity, and sustainability of 
supply chain cooperation. Contract farming can 
become an integral part of agrarian policy, where 
the government, together with the farmers and 
firms, joins in the effort to create a conducive local 
production environment. This strategy should 
include public interventions to regulate market 
access [that is, to define a framework for legal 
enforcement and legal resources], to promote 
farmers' organizations, and to provide information 
and control [that is, to define minimum public 
grades and standards]. Through these interventions, 
a framework can be implemented to enhance 
bargaining power and reduce the institutional risk 
for smallholder producers willing to participate in 
contract farming.
With regard to the definition of public grades and 
standards, it is important to note that in the 
pepper supply chain, small- and medium-scale
processors are dealing with smallholder producers. 
None of these actors usually has the capital and 
human capacity to create and implement private 
grades and standards [GstS], but the implementa­
tion of formal grades and standards is key to the 
future development of the supply chain. Clear rules 
of measurement defined by a recognized authority 
and a clear system of classification could improve 
chain coordination and reduce distrust between 
contracting parties. In the case of pepper, product 
quality has been determined by simple visual 
inspection. These "rules" are informally transmitted 
to producers by technicians and other experienced 
producers, and disputes over rejection rates are 
frequent. Owing to the absence of G&S, this study 
could not establish a positive relationship between 
contractual arrangements and quality performance. 
This situation suggests large inefficiencies in quality 
assessment procedures and lack of agreement on 
G&S. The government and local university can play 
an important role in defining minimum GscS and 
providing information on new market opportunities 
and characteristics, while forming a consensus on 
desired behavior along the supply chain. One strat­
egy for promoting local sustainable production 
could be to facilitate a variety of contractual terms 
that are all based on well-established G&S. This 
strategy would require private-public alliances in 
pursuit of agreements on product and processing 
standards.
The government also has a role to play in providing 
research and development in order to create 
opportunities for product innovation and differen­
tiation, which tend to be steered by agents close to 
the retail sector. Therefore governance structures 
in the production chain could contribute signifi­
cantly to the government's RstD and thus play an 
important role in successful innovation and 
differentiation.
In general, the government [and voluntary agencies, 
like NGOs) could strive for greater integration of 
small-scale producers in the supply chain as part of 
a strategy of integrated rural development. In the 
case study presented, the degree of integration is 
limited and highly dependent on contract terms. 
Pepper is processed upstream in the chain, and the 
limited number of processors leads to a quasi- 
monopsonistic market environment. The level of 
upgrading is limited to simple compliance with the 
standards of the domestic processor. All in all, 
pepper is an attractive nontraditional crop for
farmers who wish to diversify, if the contract 
arrangements provide them an honest price. Pepper 
can be produced in Costa Rica at relatively low 
prices, and there is still some unsatisfied domestic 
demand. Moreover, there is potential for export, 
but local production is still insufficient for proces­
sors to offset the export costs.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend a government 
policy to assure an acceptable level of competition 
and to facilitate increasing incomes and reduced 
risks for low-income pepper farmers.
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